Report on the Latin American economy : second half on 2010 by Banco de España
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2010
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 101 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2010 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2010
Report on the Latin American economy. Second half of 2010
During the fi rst half of 2010, economic recovery fi rmed in Latin America with a higher-than-
expected growth rate, the result of buoyant domestic demand in most of the countries. In the 
region as a whole1, year-on-year growth of 5.6% was posted in Q1, rising to 7.7% in Q2. Al-
though this year-on-year growth is infl uenced by a favourable base effect, average quarter-on-
quarter growth was 1.7%, above what had been seen during the fi rst half of 2008, before the 
crisis. There were hardly any exceptions to this broad trend and, in fact, only Venezuela re-
mained in recession, while Mexico is lagging somewhat in the current phase of recovery. Do-
mestic demand contributed 10 pp to the aggregate year-on-year growth in the region in Q2, 
and external demand deducted 2.3 pp, which translated into a widening of the current ac-
count defi cit to 0.3% of GDP. Nonetheless, this external imbalance was less than might have 
been expected in view of the strength of the demand for imports, due in part to the high level 
of commodities prices, which in turn contributed to the robustness of the recovery (see Chart 1 
and Table 1).
Prices also trended relatively favourably. The average infl ation rate stabilised at just over 6%, 
after rising in early 2010 to 6.6%. While this development masks sizeable differences across 
countries, infl ation has signifi cantly converged towards target in most of the countries with 
infl ation targeting arrangements, and this despite the closing of output gaps. This relative eas-
ing has, moreover, ultimately fed through to expectations, albeit with differing intensity from 
one country to another.
The soundness of these results helps explain why neither the turbulence arising from the fi scal 
and sovereign crisis in certain euro area countries, between April and June, nor the subse-
quent fears that a further slowdown would begin in the United States have had a lasting im-
pact on Latin American fi nancial markets, or worsened the growth outlook for 2010 and 2011. 
The contrary is rather the case. Growth forecasts have continued to be revised upwards, 
which is indicative of the resilience the region is showing. Among other factors, Latin America 
has benefi ted from the re-directing of its trade towards Asia, associated with the strong de-
mand for commodities from this region. In the circumstances, the credit ratings of fi ve coun-
tries (Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Ecuador and Argentina) were revised upwards. Against this 
clearly favourable backdrop, with positive interest rate spreads over the industrialised econo-
mies, and in a setting of extraordinary and potentially growing monetary stimulus in the United 
States, capital infl ows (chiefl y portfolio infl ows) have picked up in recent weeks and are begin-
ning to pose diffi culties for macroeconomic management in several countries, mainly owing to 
their impact on exchange rates, domestic liquidity and monetary policy. So far, a buffer against 
these pressures is being provided by a bigger build-up of reserves, and some countries have 
imposed administrative measures (Brazil and Peru).
From the economic policy standpoint, some countries began in the last six months to partly 
reverse the monetary stimulus deployed during the crisis. In May and June, respectively, the 
Peruvian and Chilean central banks initiated the cycle of offi cial interest rate rises on which 
Brazil had earlier embarked in April. In contrast, Colombia and Mexico held their key interest 
rates unchanged, and Argentina continued to apply an expansionary monetary policy. Re-
cently, the process of rises has been interrupted in Brazil and Peru, while the rate at which the 
Introduction
1. The average data to which this report refers are calculated using the information on seven countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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offi cial interest rate is rising has eased in Chile, a development which may have been infl u-
enced by the aforementioned upward pressure on exchange rates. In the fi scal policy realm, 
the budget balance as a percentage of GDP showed few changes in relation to the previous 
six months, at the regional level, posting a defi cit of around 2.5% of GDP. However, in several 
countries there was an improvement in primary balances, attributable almost exclusively to the 
effect of the cycle. From a more structural perspective, mention should be made of the execu-
tion of a second debt swap in Argentina, which marks progress in the normalisation of its de-
fault situation (pending the resolution of its outstanding debt with the Paris Club), and the 
presentation by the Colombian government of a fi scal rule designed to manage the revenue 
expected as a result of the boom in the mineral/energy sector in the coming decade.
The outlook for Latin America is broadly favourable, although some slowing is expected in the 
second half of 2010 owing, partly, to the moderate tightening of monetary policies. External 
conditions, marked by a very lax monetary policy that has been pursued for longer than ex-
pected in the United States and by strong growth in Asia, are looking very expansionary for the 
region, in the face of which national policies should adopt a more restrictive stance. Indeed, 
the main discernible risk is, probably, that economic policies may not respond suitably and 
may ultimately adopt a procyclical bias. Specifi cally, the dilemma facing the authorities is to act 
more resolutely to prevent their economies overheating or, conversely, to adopt a less active 
position to protect themselves from the risk of a slump in the world economy and to avoid 
measures, especially in the monetary area, that may stimulate even greater capital fl ows.
Following a fi rst quarter in which the world economy showed considerable dynamism, growing 
at a year-on-year rate of 4.5%, signs of weakness in the developed economies began to 
emerge as from the end of Q2, more markedly so in the US economy. The signs of fragility 
were to some extent expected, since the recovery had been largely underpinned by re-stock-
ing and, moreover, sizeable doubts remained over the capacity of private demand to take up 
the slack once the expansionary effects of the fi scal stimuli that had previously sustained activ-
ity progressively tailed off. US growth was checked from an annualised quarter-on-quarter 
growth rate of 3.7% in Q1 to 1.7% in Q2, while economic activity in Japan also slowed to 
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Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 September
GDP (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.8 4.2 -2.0 5.0 0.8 -2.9 -4.0 -2.5 1.4 5.6 7.7
Argentina 8.7 6.8 0.9 6.9 4.1 2.0 -0.8 -0.3 2.6 6.8 11.8
Brazil 6.1 5.1 -0.2 7.1 0.8 -2.1 -1.6 -1.2 4.3 9.0 8.8
Mexico 3.3 1.5 -6.5 1.6 -1.1 -7.9 -10.0 -6.1 -2.3 4.3 7.6
Chile 4.6 3.7 -1.5 5.2 0.7 -2.1 -4.5 -1.4 2.1 1.5 6.5
Colombia (d) 6.9 2.7 0.8 3.1 -1.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.9 3.0 4.2 4.5
Venezuela 8.1 4.8 -3.3 3.8 3.5 0.5 -2.6 -4.6 -5.8 -5.2 -1.9
Peru 8.9 9.8 0.9 10.9 6.5 1.9 -1.2 -0.6 3.4 6.1 10.1
Uruguay 7.5 8.5 2.9 9.4 7.6 2.6 1.1 2.8 4.7 8.8 10.4
CPI (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.4 7.8 6.4 8.5 8.5 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.4 6.1 6.6 6.3
Argentina 8.8 8.6 6.3 8.9 7.8 6.6 5.5 5.9 7.1 9.0 10.6 11.1
Brazil 3.6 5.7 4.9 6.3 6.2 5.8 5.2 4.4 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.7
Mexico 4.0 5.1 5.3 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.1 4.0 4.8 4.0 3.7
Chile 4.4 8.7 0.4 9.3 8.6 4.8 1.8 -1.9 -3.0 -0.3 1.2 1.9
Colombia 5.5 7.0 4.2 7.7 7.8 6.6 4.8 3.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.3
Venezuela 18.8 31.4 28.6 34.6 33.4 29.5 28.2 28.7 28.1 27.4 31.9 28.5
Peru 1.8 5.8 2.9 6.1 6.6 5.6 4.0 1.9 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.4
Uruguay 8.1 7.9 7.1 7.6 8.6 8.2 6.7 7.1 6.3 6.7 6.9 6.3
BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (c) -0.4 -0.5 -2.6 -0.2 -0.5 -1.5 -2.0 -2.8 -2.6 -2.6 -2.5
Argentina 1.1 1.4 -0.6 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4
Brazil -2.7 -1.9 -3.3 -1.8 -2.0 -2.8 -3.1 -4.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4
Mexico 0.0 -0.1 -2.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.4 -1.7 -2.4 -2.3 -1.8 -2.3
Chile 8.6 5.0 -4.6 6.1 5.0 1.3 -1.5 -3.9 -4.6 -3.8 -1.0
Colombia -2.8 -1.8 -4.3 -2.3 -1.8 -2.8 -3.0 -3.3 -3.8 -3.6 -4.3
Venezuela 3.1 -1.2 -5.4 0.9 -1.2 -2.2 -1.4 -1.3 -0.6 - -
Peru 1.8 2.2 -2.0 2.1 2.2 1.4 0.1 -0.7 -1.8 -1.3 -1.0
Uruguay 0.0 -1.5 -1.7 -1.0 -1.5 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2 -1.7 -2.0 -1.1
PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) 33.8 30.8 35.0 30.4 30.8 31.4 33.1 34.6 34.9 34.6 34.5
Argentina 52.6 44.7 47.9 45.8 44.7 41.9 44.2 46.1 48.0 48.0 47.1
Brazil 45.1 38.4 42.8 40.0 38.4 39.1 41.2 43.2 42.8 42.0 41.4
Mexico 21.0 24.5 28.2 20.8 24.5 25.4 26.7 28.4 28.2 28.5 28.7
Chile 4.1 5.2 6.1 4.5 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.8 6.1 6.8 7.4
Colombia 32.9 33.4 35.5 32.8 33.4 36.8 35.2 33.6 35.1 34.6 35.4
Venezuela 22.8 13.6 22.6 12.6 13.2 13.5 18.1 20.4 22.6 22.6 26.8
Peru 29.8 24.1 26.7 23.9 24.1 24.8 26.1 26.9 26.7 25.0 23.5
Uruguay 68.1 52.9 68.9 57.8 52.6 56.7 60.5 67.3 69.1 65.4 58.6
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (b) 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Argentina 2.8 2.1 3.7 2.8 2.2 2.0 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.0 2.4
Brazil 0.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -2.2
Mexico -0.8 -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 -1.4 -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5
Chile 4.5 -1.5 2.6 0.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.4 0.7 2.6 2.6 1.6
Colombia -2.9 -2.8 -2.2 -2.1 -2.8 -2.9 -2.8 -2.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.3
Venezuela 7.9 12.0 2.3 15.9 11.7 7.6 2.9 -0.5 2.4 5.0 6.1
Peru 1.3 -3.7 0.2 -2.4 -3.7 -3.3 -1.9 -0.8 0.2 0.1 -0.2
Uruguay -0.9 -4.8 0.7 -4.3 -4.8 -3.6 -1.1 -0.2 0.7 0.6 0.9
EXTERNAL DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (b) 19.9 17.6 20.5 18.2 17.4 18.7 19.6 21.0 20.6 19.9 19.7
Argentina 47.8 38.3 38.0 40.6 39.2 37.4 38.2 38.9 38.0 37.4 -
Brazil 14.1 12.1 12.6 12.3 11.8 12.2 13.3 14.1 12.4 12.1 11.6
Mexico 12.1 11.5 18.6 11.3 11.4 14.8 15.9 17.8 18.6 18.2 17.7
Chile 34.0 38.0 44.7 37.5 37.6 40.0 42.1 45.3 45.0 42.2 42.2
Colombia 21.4 19.1 23.2 18.7 19.1 19.9 19.7 21.9 22.9 18.8 19.4
Venezuela 24.6 19.4 19.7 20.1 18.9 18.8 18.6 19.3 19.7 21.1 24.5
Peru 30.6 27.3 28.0 28.2 27.3 27.5 28.0 28.4 28.0 27.2 25.4
Uruguay 51.0 38.5 44.7 40.5 38.2 39.2 40.9 45.4 44.5 40.7 36.7
201020092008
2007 2008 2009
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 
a. Aggregate of eight represented countries, except Uruguay. 
b. Four-quarter moving average. 
c. Excluding Venezuela. 
d. Seasonally adjusted series. 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1 
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1.5%, after having expanded at a rate of 5% in Q1. In contrast, the pattern was different in the 
euro area, which grew by 3.9% in Q2, up on 0.8% in Q1, owing to Germany’s momentum. 
However, there were also signs of slowing in the euro area at the start of Q3.
On the whole the emerging economies remained substantially buoyant during this period, China 
and India most notably so, but also Brazil. In any event, the signs of deceleration were more in 
response to policy measures aimed at avoiding an excessive rate of expansion (see Chart 2). 
Some measures aimed at cooling the real estate market in China had an effect, and led eco-
nomic indicators to resume more sustainable – though still-high – rates. As a result, the pattern 
of distribution of world economic growth, with Asia to the fore, was conducive to high and rela-
tively stable commodities prices during the last six months, which was in turn a signifi cant boost 
for Latin America as an exporting region. Crude oil prices moved in a narrow range of $70-80 for 
most of the last six months, although they rose above these levels towards the end of the period. 
Metal prices drew close to their highs for the year and agricultural commodity prices also rose 
after the summer, partly as a result of the trade restrictions imposed by Russia.
Against this background, the recovery seen on international fi nancial markets in the opening 
months of the year has been checked in the past six months. From May to June, the pre-
dominant factor was the uncertainty over the fi scal situation in the euro area. The publication 
of the stress tests of European banks in July led to some improvement, but the focus of atten-
tion shifted shortly after to doubts over the sustainability of the current recovery in the devel-
oped economies. This situation translated into greater volatility and risk-aversion on the mar-
kets and fl ight towards safer assets. And while this movement has eased subsequently, some 
focal points of fi scal vulnerability in Europe remain active.
Turning to monetary policy, the main central banks kept their offi cial interest rates close to 
zero. Nonetheless, set against the expectations prevailing only six months ago about a pos-
sible start of an exit strategy from the exceptional measures applied, the weakening of the 
economies has entailed a delay in expectations that interest rate levels will resume a normal 
footing. And it has even recently led the Bank of Japan to adopt further exceptional measures, 
while the possibility of extending quantitative easing is being considered in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Against this backdrop, US ten-year interest rates, which had tended 
to normalise (upwards) in the period to April, declined considerably in the subsequent months 
(more than 150 bp, to close to 2.50%), despite the heavy volume of sovereign issues. On the 
foreign exchange markets, the dollar initially acted as a safe haven and strengthened against 
the euro until July, given the growing uncertainty associated with the sovereign debt of certain 
European economies. However, part of the rise in the dollar was corrected from August owing 
to the doubts over US growth and the increasing likelihood of further monetary stimuli. In Sep-
tember, the strength of the yen prompted the fi rst intervention by the Bank of Japan on the 
foreign exchange markets for more than fi ve years. This intervention highlights the growing 
sensitivity of many countries, including certain developed economies, to the risk of exchange 
rate overvaluation. It also shows the greater activism afoot to mitigate such overvaluation, 
through the build-up in reserves and, increasingly extensively, through the setting of capital 
controls in the emerging economies.
The emerging markets broadly trended in line with global markets and, although they were not 
insulated from the episodes of volatility and greater risk-aversion during the six-month period, 
they did show relatively greater resilience. Sovereign spreads, approximated by the EMBI+, 
widened moderately during the bout of turbulence generated by the fi scal situation in Europe, 
narrowing subsequently to around 280 bp, very close to the low for the year and at the level at 
which this spread stood before the global fi nancial crisis. 
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Across the different regions, the Asian EMBI performed somewhat better than its Latin Ameri-
can and Eastern European counterparts. Stock markets, approximated by the dollar-denomi-
nated MSCI indices, tended to stabilise in the period to August, but rose substantially in Sep-
tember and in October. The Eastern European stock market index nonetheless performed 
worse than the other regions and remains further off the levels prior to the 2008 crisis than 
those of the other areas. Despite the fact the dollar acted as a safe-haven currency during 
some bouts of instability during the six-month period, the currencies of the emerging regions 
tended to pick up and ended the period at levels of appreciation close to the highs for the year. 
The Chinese renminbi appreciated very gradually (by over 2%) against the dollar, despite the 
June announcement of greater fl exibility for the currency.
The highlights on Latin American fi nancial markets over the past six months included, initially, 
their notable resilience in the face of the tensions arising, fi rstly, due to the doubts over the 
sustainability of certain European countries’ sovereign debt and, subsequently, to the weaken-
ing of the US economy. Despite this resilience, Latin American markets were not completely 
immune and saw some increase in volatility between May and June, accompanied by a mod-
erate depreciation of certain currencies (in particular the Brazilian real, the Colombian peso 
and the Chilean peso, which had previously been appreciating forcefully), by a widening of 
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sovereign spreads and by stock market declines. From July, the markets resumed an upward 
course which has intensifi ed in all segments (stock market, bonds, foreign exchange markets) 
in recent weeks, in particular following the intervention by the Bank of Japan on the foreign 
exchange markets, in mid-September, and coinciding with the rising expectations over further 
monetary easing in the United States.
In fact, in recent months the structure of capital fl ows has changed to some extent, in two 
directions. First, towards the emerging markets, in particular those with a favourable growth 
outlook and positive interest-rate spreads, as is the case in Latin America. And further, in fa-
vour of portfolio fl ows and, with some lag, of foreign direct investment which, though it has 
picked up since the depth of the crisis, is still far below pre-crisis levels. Signifi cantly, portfolio 
investment fl ows over the past 12 months in Latin America stood in Q2 (the latest fi gure avail-
able) at an all-time high (close to $100 billion), concentrated in the main in Brazil. However, 
direct investment fl ows in cumulative terms, likewise to Q2, stood at somewhat over $60 bil-
lion, with a more proportional distribution between Brazil, Mexico and the rest of Latin America 
(see Chart 3). There has also been a strong increase in the volume of both public and private 
international issues, following the temporary closure of the markets during the spring 
months.
The exchange rates of most of the Latin American currencies (but especially the Brazilian real, 
the Colombian peso and the Chilean peso), which had tended to strengthen as from the sum-
mer, appreciated more sharply, standing in October at levels close to their 2008 highs. Since 
the start of the year, the Colombian peso has appreciated by more than 15% against the dol-
lar. The appreciation of the Chilean peso, the Brazilian real and the Peruvian sol has been 
somewhat more moderate but, if calculated from their low in 2008, the fi gure exceeds 40% in 
Brazil and 30% in Chile and Colombia (see Chart 4). In contrast, the Mexican peso has held 
relatively stable throughout the period (except at the time instability was at its height in Europe, 
when it tended to appreciate) and the Argentine peso has continued on its gradual but con-
stant depreciating course (20% in cumulative terms since mid-2008, 5% in the year to date).
The appreciation of exchange rates, in parallel with the rise on stock markets and the narrow-
ing of sovereign spreads, has once again given rise to discussions in the countries concerned 
about the risks posed by the strong increase in capital infl ows and the excessive appreciation 
of exchange rates. There are also talks about how to manage them, mainly after the unsuc-
cessful discussions in this connection at the IMF meetings. Against this background, Brazil 
raised its tax on fi nancial transactions from 2% to 4% in October, subsequently increasing it to 
6% for fi xed-income investment fl ows, a measure equivalent to the introduction of capital 
controls via prices. Peru likewise introduced various capital controls and even countries such 
as Chile, traditionally inclined not to intervene on the foreign exchange market, left the door 
open to considering such controls, as a last resort. The build-up of reserves has thus contin-
ued, meaning they are at an all-time high, and some countries are easing the pace at which 
they are raising their offi cial interest rates (Brazil, Peru and Chile).
Key developments in respect of credit default swaps (CDSs) were their stability in Brazil, Mex-
ico and Chile (moving in a narrow range between 100 bp and 150 bp in the two former coun-
tries, and below 100 bp in the latter) and, in contrast, the strong widening seen in risk premia 
in Venezuela and in Argentina (where CDSs widened to 1400 bp in June, strongly affected by 
the European sovereign crisis). In Argentina, risk premia recently moved back towards their 
low for the last fi ve years (500 bp), a trend that began following the resolution of the unpaid 
debt swap in June. However, in Venezuela the economic downturn, elections and the foreign 
exchange market restrictions led CDSs to hold at levels close to their all-time high until very 
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recently. As regards developments on stock markets, the Argentine, Mexican and Brazilian 
bourses fell by 15% between May and June, but recovered gradually thereafter, to stand once 
more in September at highs for the year, an all-time high in the case of Argentina. That said, 
the stock markets that posted the biggest gains were those of Chile and Colombia (more than 
30% in the year to date).
Economic growth was surprisingly high in most of the Latin American economies in the fi rst 
half of the year. At the same time, the contribution of domestic demand to the region’s year-
on-year growth progressively increased, exceeding 10 pp (albeit with a sizeable contribution 
from stocks), while external demand subtracted more than 2 pp in Q2. This mirrored the pat-
tern prior to the crisis, although much more markedly so.
All the economies – with the exceptions of Mexico and, above all, Venezuela, which remains in 
recession – showed strong dynamism in the fi rst half of the year. In Q1 there was a strong in-
crease in the region’s year-on-year growth rate of more than 4 pp to 5.6%, which was to some 
extent biased upwards owing to a base effect (the quarter-on-quarter rate was 1.1%). How-
ever, the acceleration in activity was clearer in Q2, with quarter-on-quarter growth of 2.3%, 
Activity and demand
CHART 3 
SOURCES: JP Morgan, IMF and national statistics. 
 
a. A positive sign denotes a current account deficit. 
b. Difference between investment flows and the current account balance (-). 
c. WEO forecasts (October 2010) for 2010-2011. 
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raising the rate on a year earlier to 7.7%. The Brazilian economy was notably dynamic, grow-
ing at a year-on-year rate of close to 9% in both quarters, underpinned by the strength of 
domestic demand (see Chart 5), and providing a boost to its closest trading partners: Argen-
tina (which posted year-on-year growth of 11.8% in Q2) and Uruguay (10.4%), something not 
habitual in the past (see Box 1). In recent months, however, some easing has been seen in 
Brazil (mainly in the industrial sector, affected by the discontinuation of certain tax exemptions 
for investment), though it has sustained high growth rates, given the strong labour market (the 
unemployment rate stood at a low of 6.7% of the labour force in August), the continuing mo-
mentum of lending by public-sector banks (which is growing at a year-on-year rate of 30%) 
and favourable business and consumer confi dence indicators.2 In Chile (where growth in Q2 
stood at 6.5% year-on-year) and Peru (10.1%), economic activity posted very high rates, 
chiefl y as a result of the pick-up in domestic demand and, most specifi cally, in investment. 
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a. Minimum value since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (15.9.2008). The value as at that 
specific date is taken from Argentina. 
b. MSCI Latin America Index in local currency. 
c. Short-term interest rate less inflation rate. 
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2. However, for the moment the easing has been taken as a factor for justifying the interruption in late August of the cycle 
of interest-rate rises in Brazil, in addition to other structural reasons.
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Conversely, the recovery in Mexico continued to be very sluggish, dependent on the foreign 
sector and tied to the US business cycle, and with a scant contribution from domestic de-
mand. In this setting, and although activity grew substantially in Q2 (2.3% quarter-on-quarter, 
and 7.6% year-on-year), part of it can be attributed to a base effect and to a relatively consid-
erable build-up in stocks (see the fi nal section in this report on country-by-country economic 
developments).
Analysis of the composition of GDP on the demand side identifi es the drivers of growth at the 
regional level: on one hand, the strong recovery in gross capital formation (which posted growth 
of close to 17% year-on-year in Q2) and, on the other, the expansion of private consumption 
(5.8% year-on-year) (see Chart 6), the behaviour of whose main determinants remained, with 
few exceptions, very positive throughout the period. Investment was spurred on by the im-
proved growth outlook (which has given rise to an upward revision of the business confi dence 
indicators), the rise in commodities prices, the decline in real interest rates and the greater avail-
ability of fi nancing (external and internal alike, with credit on a gradually recovering trend). These 
factors broadly allowed the halt in investment decisions between late 2008 and end-2009 to be 
overcome. Even so, investment as a proportion of GDP remains on average some 3 pp below 
the highs reached in early 2008, set against the gradual closure of output gaps. In addition, 
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a. Aggregate of the seven main economies. 
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The external integration of the Latin American economies has in re-
cent years undergone a signifi cant reorientation, in particular as re-
gards their trade.1 Since the end of the 1980s, and especially in the 
second half of the current decade, the region has recorded an in-
crease in its openness to trade (as measured by the sum of exports 
and imports divided by GDP), which reached 46% in 2010, accom-
panied by greater diversifi cation in its export destination countries, 
as shown by the sharp decline in the Herfi ndahl indices measuring 
the concentration of foreign trade.2
The main trends in the reorientation of the region’s foreign trade are 
presented in Panel 1 and the accompanying table. As can be seen, 
the United States continues to be Latin America’s main trading 
partner, although its relative importance has substantially dimin-
ished over the last decade. In particular, the share of exports and 
imports corresponding to the United States has fallen from 55% in 
2000 to 38% in 2010. This space has largely been occupied by the 
emerging Asian economies, whose share rose from 4.9% to 14.7% 
during the same period and, among the latter, by China, whose 
share increased from 1.3% of the region’s foreign trade to 9.3%. 
Between these dates, intra-regional trade rose from 14.4% to 
17.6%. These overall results are infl uenced, however, by the fi g-
ures of Mexico, the region’s largest exporter and importer, which in 
the 1980s already had strong ties with the United States (63% of 
exports and imports) and weak ties with the rest of Latin America 
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BOX 1THE REORIENTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE
1. This box refers to trade integration. The region’s financial integration, 
measured by its foreign assets and liabilities, has remained practically un-
changed since 2000 (rising from 98% of GDP in 2000 to 102% of GDP in 
2009). 2. These indices are lower than, for example, those calculated for 
Spain (around 10 for exports and 7.5 for imports).
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España. 
 
a. Percentage of all exports and imports corresponding to each country/block depicted. 
b. Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Haiti and Bahamas. 
c. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador. 
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BOX 1THE REORIENTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE (cont’d)
HERFINDAHL
INDEX
(a)
%
OF GDP
EXPORTS IMPORTS EXP. IMP. EXP. IMP.
Argentina
1980-1990 US 11.8 Netherlands 10.0 Brazil 8.2 US 20.3 Brazil 13.9 Germany 10.2 4.1 8.9 9.0 6.2
2006-2010 Brazil 19.0 China 8.0 Chile 7.7 Brazil 32.5 US 12.8 China 10.7 6.3 14.0 23.7 19.0
Brazil
1980-1990 US 25.0 Netherlands 6.6 Japan 6.4 US 18.8 Iraq 10.7 Argentina 9.5 8.2 7.2 10.1 7.9
2006-2010 US 14.3 Argentina 8.7 China 8.6 US 15.6 China 11.3 Argentina 8.4 4.7 5.9 13.2 12.1
Mexico
1980-1990 US 62.2 Spain 6.7 Japan 6.4 US 64.7 Germany 5.2 Japan 5.0 39.9 42.6 16.6 13.6
2006-2010 US 81.5 Canada 2.9 Germany 1.5 US 50.1 China 10.9 Japan 5.4 66.5 27.1 28.1 29.7
Chile
1980-1990 US 19.4 Japan 11.8 Germany 10.7 US 21.2 Japan 9.0 Brazil 8.6 7.9 7.5 27.2 26.5
2006-2010 China 15.0 US 12.5 Japan 9.9 US 18.8 China 11.6 Argentina 10.0 6.5 7.7 44.0 33.8
Colombia
1980-1990 US 35.5 Germany 14.2 Netherlands 5.2 US 35.2 Japan 9.9 Germany 6.7 15.8 15.0 14.9 13.9
2006-2010 US 36.1 Venezuela 15.6 Ecuador 4.2 US 29.1 China 9.6 Mexico 8.4 16.3 11.3 17.3 21.2
Venezuela
1980-1990 US 40.8 Canada 5.0 Neth. Ant. 4.5 US 46.0 Germany 7.0 Japan 6.4 17.9 23.0 27.5 22.2
2006-2010 US 38.9 Neth. Ant. 8.1 China 3.7 US 26.5 Colombia 13.1 Brazil 9.9 16.2 10.9 29.2 22.3
Peru
1980-1990 US 30.0 Japan 12.5 UK 5.1 US 31.5 Japan 7.7 Germany 7.1 11.7 12.2 16.7 16.2
2006-2010 US 20.2 China 14.1 Canada 8.7 US 22.1 China 10.6 Brazil 8.5 8.5 8.6 27.2 22.4
Ecuador
1980-1990 US 51.4 Japan 3.9 Panama 3.8 US 32.5 Japan 11.4 Germany 7.9 27.0 13.6 25.6 24.7
2006-2010 US 43.3 Peru 9.5 Chile 6.0 US 23.2 Colombia 10.6 Venezuela 9.8 21.0 9.2 35.7 36.6
Uruguay
1980-1990 Brazil 19.4 US 10.8 Germany 8.9 Brazil 20.4 Argentina 12.3 US 9.3 7.4 8.4 21.8 19.6
2006-2010 Brazil 17.4 China 8.2 Argentina 7.5 Argentina 19.7 Brazil 17.8 China 9.9 6.1 10.1 28.4 30.0
Latin America
1980-1990 US 36.6 Japan 5.9 Germany 4.6 US 36.6 Germany 6.7 Japan 6.3 14.7 15.1 14.5 12.0
2006-2010 US 43.2 China 5.4 Brazil 2.7 US 33.1 China 10.6 Brazil 5.3 19.6 13.3 22.4 21.1
Latin America excluding Mexico
1980-1990 US 27.6 Japan 5.7 Germany 5.7 US 26.2 Germany 7.3 Japan 6.8 9.3 9.2 13.6 11.3
2006-2010 US 20.8 China 8.1 Brazil 3.8 US 18.9 China 10.3 Brazil 8.3 6.2 6.7 20.1 17.7
SOURCES: IMF and Banco de España. 
 
a. Sum of the square of the shares of each trading partner in each country's or region's total foreign trade. The bounds of the index are 
therefore between 0 and 100. 
TABLE 1TRADE REORIENTATION: MAIN PARTNERS  
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BOX 1THE REORIENTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE (cont’d)
(5.8%). Its dependence on the United States increased following 
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1995 
(to reach 81.5% in the case of its exports in 2010).3 The countries 
of Central America and the Caribbean are in a similar situation. 
Their trade dependence on the United States rose to 49.2% in 
2000, and rose further following the signature of various free trade 
agreements with the northern neighbour, which supplement the set 
of treaties contained in CAFTA + DR.4 Nonetheless, even in these 
countries the weight of emerging Asia – and specifi cally China – 
has grown substantially in recent years, although it is still at rela-
tively low levels (4.6% of the total). By contrast, foreign trade devel-
opments in the main South American countries show how intra-
regional trade has increased and the extent of the diversifi cation 
towards Asia, to the point that since 2004 Latin America has been 
the main source and destination for the exports and imports of 
South America, and the share of emerging Asia (basically China) 
rose from 6.5% in 2000 to 18% in 2010.
The factors driving this reorientation have been, on one hand, the 
strengthening, with progress and setbacks, of the most advanced 
regional trade agreements, such as MERCOSUR5, along with the 
new strategy of seeking bilateral trade agreements with the Pacifi c 
basin followed by certain Andean countries, such as Chile, Peru and, 
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3. When Mexico is removed from the analysis the trends described above be-
come even clearer: the United States represents 19% of the foreign trade of the 
region without Mexico, a similar share to that of emerging Asia (18%), and be-
hind those of intra-regional trade (25.6%) and the EU (24.2%). 4. Dominican 
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement.
5. The increase in intra-regional trade has been based fundamentally on manu-
factures (and among the latter, medium-technology consumer goods, such as 
cars), which may explain the decline in the share of the region since the start of 
the crisis in 2008.
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THE REORIENTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE (cont’d) BOX 1
to a lesser extent, Colombia; and on the other hand, the strong and 
prolonged increase in the demand for (and prices of) commodities 
(the main export of a large part of Latin America)6 worldwide, but 
especially in Asia and, in particular, China. The entry of the latter into 
primary product markets has made it the main world importer of ag-
ricultural (17.4% of total world imports) and metal commodities 
(20.7%), and the third largest importer of oil (6.7% of the total, behind 
only the United States and Japan).7 The commodities boom since 
2003 has also raised the value of commodities in total exports (from 
25% to 34.1% or, in the case of the Andean countries, from 55.6% to 
64.4%), which therefore explains a large part of the increase in the 
region’s openness.815 In this context, China has signifi cant further 
potential to develop, despite the sharp increase in its share of Latin 
American trade, since no country in the region has yet signed an ex-
tensive free trade agreement with the Asian giant.9
This reorientation of foreign trade has been to the region’s advantage 
during the international fi nancial crisis, since the revival of external 
demand, once world trade (especially in Asia) had begun to grow 
again and commodity prices had recovered from their collapse, has 
contributed to the rapid recovery in activity. The geographical struc-
ture of external trade would also partially explain the heterogeneity of 
the impact of the crisis in the region. On the one hand, Mexico and 
Central America, the countries most dependent on trade with the 
United States, have experienced recessions without precedent since 
the 1930s, while on the other hand, those countries that have in-
creased their trade with Asia have had relatively small declines in 
GDP in comparison with the past (see Chart 2).
Looking ahead, the new structure of foreign trade may help strength-
en the external demand of Latin America, given that the reorientation 
has been towards more dynamic economies that are predicted to be 
the engines of world trade in the coming years. Chart 2 presents an 
estimate of GDP growth in the countries with which the region trades, 
which may be an indicator of the potential growth of Latin American 
export markets until the year 2015. According to these estimates, if 
the Latin American countries had maintained their 1980s structure of 
trade, the growth in GDP of their trading partners between 2010 and 
2015 would on average be 0.6 pp lower than with the current struc-
ture. If Mexico is excluded from this calculation, the difference is even 
greater, at close to 0.8 pp on average. In addition, these new trading 
partners of Latin America have a higher import elasticity of GDP 
growth than the rest of the world (see Chart 2), and need almost 
double the amount of energy that the developed countries need to 
generate $1,000 of GDP, energy products being one of the areas in 
which Latin American countries are specialised.
On the other hand, the new structure of foreign trade also entails a 
somewhat higher risk, as seen in Chart 2. The average sovereign rat-
ing (weighted by the countries’ shares in foreign trade) of the group of 
countries with which Latin America trades is lower than it would be if 
the region had maintained the same geographical structure of ex-
ports and imports as in the 1980s. That said, the risk is still low and, 
in the wake of the crisis, the risk outlook for the Asian countries has 
improved relative to that of the advanced countries. Another element 
of weakness that should be highlighted is that all these trends may 
strengthen a commodities-based export model, which history shows 
can, in some cases, be detrimental to the development of other more 
dynamic sectors and, ultimately, limit growth potential. Bucking this 
trend will be one of the main challenges for this region in the coming 
years.
6. Brazil is the ninth largest world exporter of agricultural commodities and the 
fi fth largest exporter of food products; Venezuela is the ninth largest exporter of 
fossil fuels and Chile the fi fth largest exporter of metals. 7. With regard to bi-
lateral trade in primary products, China is Brazil’s main trading partner (ac-
counting for 20.9% of its total commodities exports in the last fi ve years, as 
against 8.9% of all its exports); in Argentina, China is the main destination for 
exports of soya oil (30.9% of the total), soya beans (79.2%), oil (42.85) and 
leather (35%); in Peru, more than 87% of trade with China is in commodities, 
and China is the main trading partner in most metals, such as copper (38% of 
the total) and lead (60% of the total); in Chile, 43% of all copper exports go to 
China. 8. ECLAC (2010), Latin America and the Caribbean in the World 
Economy 2009-2010. 9. Chile, in 2005, and Peru and Costa Rica, in 2010, 
have been the pioneers in seeking such an agreement.
there were specifi c shocks in some countries (the record harvest and the boost to manufactur-
ing exports to Brazil in Argentina, and the earthquake in Chile and the subsequent rebound in 
investment) which help explain much of the pattern of investment in these countries.
Turning to developments in private consumption, the signifi cant resilience of this variable in 
most countries was notable, and may be related to the better behaviour of labour markets 
compared with previous crises, to the lack of a decline in real wages and probably, too, to the 
rapid recovery in confi dence. In this respect, although signifi cant differences were observed 
from one country to another, the elasticity of the unemployment rate to the change in GDP was 
notably less than in previous recessions.3 Secondly, although there was a reduction in private 
3. See World Bank (2010), From Global Collapse to Recovery, in the section devoted to labour markets in Latin America.
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dependent employment and a rise in self-employment and non-remunerated family work 
(thereby interrupting the ongoing relative reduction in the shadow economy observed in prior 
years), there was no generalised precariousness in dependent employment4 (a notable excep-
tion will be Mexico). One crucial explanatory factor is that many of the governments in the re-
gion were able to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies, while in previous crises 
they were obliged to adopt adjustment policies. A part of these policies had a favourable im-
pact on employment, e.g. increases in public investment, emergency employment programmes 
(temporary job creation for the unemployed in socially useful infrastructure maintenance or 
construction), job preservation programmes, social protection policies (extension of the dura-
tion of unemployment insurance), etc. Further, unlike in previous crises, real wages did not fall, 
given the low infl ation and the downward stickiness of nominal wages. In this respect, and with 
some delay in relation to the recovery in activity, credit to the private sector is picking up in 
most of the countries (see Chart 7), despite the withdrawal of public banking (except in Brazil). 
In Mexico, however, the main determinants of consumption continued to show signifi cant 
weakness: peso-denominated remittance revenues are below their level one year ago, con-
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4. See ILO (2010), Panorama Laboral 2009. América Latina y el Caribe.
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sumer credit continued to decline and formal employment held below its October 2008 level, 
against a background of continuous growth in shadow-economy employment.
The negative contribution of external demand to growth is another signifi cant feature of the last 
six-month period. Admittedly, exports increased substantially in value, by close to 30% year-
on-year, largely as a result of the rise in commodities prices, linked in turn to the robustness of 
Asian demand; but the buoyancy of domestic demand tended to translate into a deterioration 
in the aggregate trade balance, given that the growth of imports exceeded 45% in June, eas-
ing off subsequently. The trade balance has thus retained a surplus of slightly more than 2% of 
regional GDP thanks to the favourable impact of the terms of trade (although the balance is in 
defi cit in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico). Despite the poorer performance of the defi -
cit on incomes and services, the current defi cit remains very low (0.3% of GDP at the regional 
level in Q2). Country by country, there is a clear difference between those running a relatively 
comfortable current surplus (mainly Venezuela and Argentina) and those running a defi cit (es-
pecially Brazil, whose current defi cit of 2.2% of GDP is once again at a level unseen since 
2002, following the worsening in recent quarters) (see Chart 8). In any event, in the region as 
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a. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. 
b. Eight biggest economies. 
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a. Customs data in dollars, aggregate of the seven biggest economies. 
b. IIF data and stimates. 
c. Four-quarter moving average. 
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a whole the sharp infl ow of capital is allowing the current defi cit to be comfortably fi nanced 
and, moreover, it is accentuating the build-up in reserves.
The higher frequency indicators for Q3 point to some slowing in activity at the regional level, 
partly as a result of a less favourable base effect, but also due to the moderate tightness of 
monetary policy in certain countries. Accordingly, the cyclical peak in year-on-year growth 
rates might already have been reached in Q2. Chile (where the impulse of post-earthquake 
reconstruction has yet to be felt) and Venezuela (where rates could turn positive) would be the 
main exceptions to this general trend.
After having risen in the period to Q2, average infl ation for the region tended to stabilise at 
a year-on-year rate of 6.3% in August and September, generally performing better than 
expected, though with signifi cant differences from one country to another. This stabilisation 
refl ected the easing in the growth of food and, to a lesser extent, of energy prices, and the 
maintenance of the prices of other components (which would be a proxy for core infl ation) 
Prices and 
macroeconomic policies
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(see Chart 9). In the main economies with infl ation targets (Brazil and Mexico), consumer 
prices converged towards the central bank targets; in Brazil infl ation stood at 4.7% year-
on-year in September, having slipped by 0.5 pp in relation to the start of the year, and in 
Mexico at 3.7% year-on-year, 1.3 pp down on the level at the start of the year. The main 
difference between both is that in Mexico core infl ation also fell and, by contrast, in Brazil it 
held stable, although relatively high. In Chile, Peru and Colombia, prices moved on a more 
uneven path (upwards in the fi rst two countries, and downwards in the latter), but the three 
countries also held in their target ranges (see Table 2). Only in Argentina was there an ap-
preciable acceleration in the offi cial infl ation rate, to over 11% year-on-year (other meas-
ures place infl ation far above this level), while in Venezuela infl ation remained very high at 
around 30%.
Against this background, three of the region’s central banks with infl ation targets raised their 
offi cial interest rates. Brazil initiated the cycle of rises in April, raising rates by 200 bp to August 
(up to 10.75%). It was followed by Peru in May (which shaved 175 bp off to September, when 
it initiated a pause) and by Chile in June (225 bp). In Mexico and Colombia, offi cial rates held 
stable against the backdrop of more accommodating output gaps.
INFLATION AND OFFICIAL INTEREST RATES 
Year-on-year rates of change 
CHART 9
SOURCES: National statistics and Banco de España. 
 
a. Aggregate of the seven main economies. 
b. Official rates. 
c. In-house calculation stripping out the food and energy indices from the overall index. 
d. Weighted average of the official rates of the five countries with inflation targets. 
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BOX 2THE ROLE OF PUBLIC BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA. RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
The global economic and fi nancial crisis affected Latin America 
through various channels, giving rise, inter alia, to a sharp contraction 
in credit to the private sector during 2008 Q4. This contraction 
proved, however, relatively limited in time and tended to ease off over 
the course of 2009 and 2010. One of the factors behind this favour-
able development was the increased activity of public banks (and, in 
particular, of development banks), on which most of the credit-stimu-
lus measures adopted by Latin American governments were centred. 
This box compares the role of public banks in Brazil, Chile and Mexi-
co, the Latin American countries where they were most relevant in 
terms of the provision of credit to the private sector during the crisis.1 
Following a brief review of the stimulus measures, public banks’ ac-
tivity is compared with that of domestic and foreign private banks 
during the crisis. Some conclusions are then drawn from the com-
parison and some of the main risks looking ahead are considered.
Firstly, it should be stressed that the countercyclical action of public 
banks in Latin America was possible thanks to their signifi cant pres-
ence in the countries under study (see Panel 1). But there are consid-
erable differences across the countries in this respect. The presence 
of public banking has traditionally been greater in Brazil, where cred-
it to the private sector granted by the development bank BNDES and 
the two major public commercial banks (Banco do Brasil and Caixa 
Económica Federal) accounted before the crisis for 36% of the total 
credit to the private sector (15% of GDP). In Mexico and Chile, the 
signifi cance of public banking has been relatively more limited, al-
though prior to the crisis public banks accounted for no small part of 
the total credit to the private sector, 9% and 13% (equivalent to 1.5% 
and 10.5% of GDP), respectively.
Of the three countries, it is Brazil where public banking was of most 
importance in sustaining credit to the private sector during the crisis. 
In the period from late 2008 to early 2009, the resources of the devel-
 Banco Central de Brasil, Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores de México, Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones 
de Chile and Banco de España. 
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1. Other countries, such as Argentina and Venezuela, also have a signifi cant 
public banking sector, but their function in providing credit to the private sector 
was less signifi cant during the crisis.
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opment bank BNDES were increased by 100 billion reales (3.2% of 
GDP), followed by an additional equivalent contribution of 2.3% of 
GDP in the fi rst half of 2010. The increase in resources, in both cases 
through extraordinary contributions by the Treasury2, allowed the size 
of the bank to practically double, thereby reinforcing its habitual ac-
tivities (the granting of long-term credit, commercial loans to SMEs, 
and investment in capital goods and exports). Throughout 2008 Q4 
and 2009 Q1, measures were also adopted to boost the activity of 
the public commercial banks. As a result, the growth rate of credit 
from development banks to the private sector exceeded 30% year-
on-year during 2009, with highs in excess of 50% (see Panel 2). As it 
coincided with a period in which other banks’ provision of credit 
eased off signifi cantly, more than 80% of the credit to the private sec-
tor in late 2009 was extended by public banks, while private com-
mercial banks cut their contribution strongly and the contribution of 
foreign banks fell to zero. As a result, thanks to the contribution of 
public banks, and although total credit to the private sector slowed 
(from a very high rate of over 30% year-on-year before the crisis), it 
did not actually contract and held at a positive growth rate of around 
10% year-on-year in early 2009, before picking up again.
The signifi cance of development banks also increased in Mexico dur-
ing the crisis (see Panel 3). From June to August 2009, credit to the 
private sector extended by development banks posted a most con-
siderable rate of expansion of close to 60% year-on-year. However, 
given their lesser importance in the Mexican banking system, devel-
opment banks’ contribution was more limited in sustaining aggregate 
credit. The increase in activity derived from two stimulus plans: one in 
October 2008 and the other in January 2009. These included in-
creases in resources (in particular to Nacional Financiera and Ban-
comext) to support credit and ease credit constraints on specifi c 
productive sectors that had faced diffi culties in gaining access to 
funding, such as SMEs, the agricultural sector, housing and infra-
structure. The positive growth rates exhibited by public banks are in 
contrast to the contraction in credit from foreign banks and the stag-
nation in credit from domestic private banks, but their lesser weight 
was unable to prevent total credit to the private sector from declining 
from a year-on-year growth rate of 25% before the crisis to a rate 
close to 0% during 2009.
Finally, the countercyclical fi scal and monetary policies pursued in 
Chile exerted greater effects during the crisis, although the role of 
development banks proved less decisive. Of note, however, was the 
reinforcement of the role of the CORFO (Chile’s Production Develop-
ment Corporation) and, in particular, the $500 million capital increase 
at the development bank BancoEstado approved in November 2008, 
and completed during 2009 (the equivalent to a capital increase of 
50%) which, as in Brazil and in Mexico, enabled credit to preferential 
sectors (SMEs, exporters, housing3) to be increased. Further to these 
measures, credit from development banks to the private sector post-
ed growth of around 20% year-on-year, in clear contrast to develop-
ments at private commercial banks (both domestic and foreign), 
which recorded notable declines. Nonetheless, as in Mexico, this 
boost translated into a relatively small contribution to credit growth at 
the height of the crisis, which did not manage to prevent a signifi cant 
contraction in total credit to the private sector (see Panel 4).
In sum, in the three countries under study, and as a result of the 
stimulus measures adopted, public banks took on a leading role after 
the global economic and fi nancial crisis. Their dynamism coincided 
with a signifi cant easing off of the activity of private commercial banks 
and, in particular, of foreign banks. One notable difference between 
Brazil (on one hand) and Mexico and Chile (on the other) regarding 
the behaviour of development banks concerns their size and, there-
fore, their capacity to impact credit to the private sector, and this 
capacity was far greater in Brazil than in the other two countries. The 
other essential difference lies in the fact that whereas in Mexico and 
Chile public banks’ activity may be considered strictly countercycli-
cal, since it accelerated during the fi nancial crisis and eased as cred-
it from private banks picked up, in Brazil it maintained its pace of 
activity throughout 2010, despite monetary tightening by the central 
bank, the strong expansion in the economy and the pick-up in cred-
it from private banks. In this respect, although the role played by 
public banks during the crisis should be viewed positively, their activ-
ity poses risks and questions in a setting in which economic activity 
resumes a normal footing. One such risk is the potential increase in 
bad debts arising from a rapid growth in credit. Others will be the 
risks of competition with private commercial banks, the possibility of 
credit market segmentation and, in some cases, greater ineffi ciency. 
In Brazil’s case, where development banks’ activity has been more 
extended over time, potential risks of procyclicality and of confl ict 
with monetary policy conduct arise, in addition to the growing quasi-
fi scal cost derived from the subsidised nature of the credit.4 Lastly, 
the reaffi rmation of the role of public banking after its favourable im-
pact during the crisis once again highlights the problems generally 
associated with this type of activity.
BOX 2THE ROLE OF PUBLIC BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA. RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS (cont’d)
2. Traditionally, the main source of resources for BNDES has been the unem-
ployment fund (FAT by its Portuguese acronym). However, the extraordinary 
contribution by the Treasury, by means of public debt issues, has converted it 
into the main source of funding.
3. Development banking also played a relevant role in the initiative, unveiled in 
March 2009, to boost bank and non-bank credit. 4. The injection of resourc-
es into the BNDES creates a fi scal cost for the Treasury, which might amount 
to around 0.3 pp of GDP per annum. Treasury resources are remunerated at a 
long-term interest rates that stands at 6%, and the average cost of the Treas-
ury’s internal debt is around 11% at present.
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Both the improvement in the infl ation performance as from April in Brazil and the tightening 
of monetary policy in Brazil, Chile and Peru contributed to improving infl ation expectations in 
these countries, following the deterioration in the fi rst half of the year. However, from a longer-
term perspective, recent price developments give rise to several considerations. First, it 
should be stressed that infl ation has generally been moderate, at a time of high growth and 
progressive closing of output gaps. Further, commodities prices, which are traditionally a 
major determinant of consumer price pressures in Latin America given its status as an ex-
porting region, have not prompted greater tensions in this period, despite their rising trend 
(more than 25% since the start of the year in the case of the food price index, and 20% in 
that of the overall commodities prices index). Admittedly, these increases pass through with 
some delay to consumer prices and may have been partly contained by the rising trend of the 
Brazilian, Chilean and Colombian currencies, but perhaps not in their entirety. Moreover, fi scal 
and quasi-fi scal policies (e.g. public credit) have not adopted, in practically any of the coun-
tries, a clearly restrictive stance (see Box 2). Finally, despite the tightening of monetary policy 
in the three countries, real interest rates have remained extraordinarily low in historical terms, 
and even lower in Mexico and Colombia. All these factors would suggest that, despite the 
favourable recent performance, the risks to infl ation might be on the upside in most other 
countries, against the background of pressures on the domestic demand side. Nonetheless, 
given that expectations have remained relatively well-anchored, consideration has been given 
in Brazil – as it might also be in other countries in the region, such as Chile and Peru – to the 
possibility that there has been a structural change that allows infl ation-free growth with lower 
real interest rates than in the past.5 The concerns over the appreciation of the exchange rate 
and over the expansionary effects of short-term capital infl ows act as a deterrent to any fur-
ther tightening of monetary policy, all the more so when US real interest rates have remained 
so low.
In the economies without infl ation targets, monetary policies continued to evidence an expan-
sionary bias, which translated into persistently high infl ation rates. The Argentine central bank 
relaxed its monetary targets in August, despite the overheating economy. It raised its growth 
target for M2 by more than 10 pp, to 29.4% at the end of the year, which in practice entails 
5. There is great uncertainty surrounding the neutral real interest rate, given its non-observable nature, but the central 
bank highlights the reduction in the real interest rates over recent years (currently at around 5%) and various structural 
changes in the Brazilian economy that would point to a reduction in this variable. These changes include most notably 
the increase in domestic saving in the economy, through the reduction of debt by means of primary surpluses, and the 
economy’s greater attractiveness to external saving, owing to the reduction in sovereign risk. Also of note is the develop-
ment of fi nancial markets and the improvement in monetary policy transmission.
Target September Expectations (a) Target Expectations (a)
Brazil 4.5 ± 2 4.7 5.3 4.5 ± 2 5.0
Mexico 3 ± 1 3.7 4.6 3 ± 1 3.9
Chile 3 ± 1 1.9 3.7 3 ± 1 3.2
Colombia 3 ± 1 2.3 3.1 3 ± 1 3.8
Peru 2 ± 1 2.4 2.7 2 ± 1 2.5
2011
Country
2010
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 2
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a. Consensus Forecasts September 2010 expectations for the end of the year, 
as for target.
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accommodating a higher level of infl ation. In Venezuela, the January devaluation translated 
into a further quickening in infl ation, to 32%.
Turning to fi scal policy, probably the key aspect has been the improvement in the primary bal-
ance in the region as a whole, reversing the trend of the two previous years. This is the result 
of the pick-up in public revenue (see Chart 10), since the growth rate of expenditure generally 
remained very high. This was the case for Argentina, Brazil (despite the pre-election freeze on 
expenditure amounting to 0.3 pp of GDP), Chile and Peru (which also set spending ceilings). 
One exception is Mexico, where the budget defi cit widened to 2.3% of GDP (the primary defi -
cit was 0.1%), against the background of widespread sluggishness in revenue (except oil-re-
lated receipts) as a result of the cycle, and despite the moderation in spending. That said, and 
unlike the other countries, Mexico’s fi scal policy stance remains moderately restrictive in the 
budget for 2011.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND MAIN PUBLIC SECTOR FIGURES 
Billions, year-on-year changes and percentage of GDP 
CHART 10
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 
a. Change  in reserves from December 2008 to September 2010. Change in the exchange rate between the 
minimum recorded in 2008 Q4 and the average rate for September 2010. 
b. Seven biggest economies 
c. Deflated by the CPI. 
d. Excludes untendered debt in the debt swap offer of 2005 
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The highlight of trade integration processes in Latin America in 2010 to date – in a setting of 
prolonged stagnation – has been the agreement to fi nalise the drafting of the common cus-
toms code in Mercosur, following more than four years of delay, and a timeframe for the 
elimination of the double charge under the Common External Tariff. The Andean Community 
(CAN) continues to face serious obstacles, insofar as one of its members (Venezuela) might 
join Mercosur; a further two members (Peru and Colombia) have kept up their strategy of re-
orienting their foreign trade, especially towards the Pacifi c basin, using bilateral agreements; 
and the remaining members (Ecuador and Bolivia) did not join negotiations with the United 
States and the EU. During the period under study, Peru initiated talks with South Korea, Ja-
pan and Panama; and further, on 1 March the agreement entered into with China in late 2009 
came into force. Peru and Colombia reached a free trade agreement with the European Un-
ion in early March 2010, which was ratifi ed at the joint May summit. Colombia, meantime, 
initiated negotiations with Korea and ratifi ed an agreement with Canada, pending approval by 
the US Congress of the free trade treaty between both countries. Chile signed a free trade 
agreement with Thailand, and Costa Rica reached agreements with Singapore and China. 
Finally, in mid-August Mexico announced an increase in various tariffs on US imports, in re-
sponse to the suspension of an agreement for the provision of Mexican transport services in 
the United States.
As regards structural reforms, a fi scal rule was approved in Colombia whose aim is to reduce 
debt to levels consistent with an investment grade credit rating (28% of GDP within 10 years), 
in addition to successfully pursuing a fi scal policy insulated from the business cycle and man-
aging the foreseeable expansion in the oil sector in the coming years, easing its macroeco-
nomic and fi scal effects, and refl ecting inter-generational equity considerations. To achieve the 
fi rst goal a structural primary balance target was set for the public sector at 0.6% of GDP 
between 2010 and 2020. Further, an implicit target was set for structural saving from oil rev-
enues, which will be geared to reducing debt, and may be the basis for a future saving fund.
Along the same lines, Chile set up an advisory committee to amend the calculation methodol-
ogy on which the structural fi scal rule is based. The committee’s recommendations (basically, 
not to adjust on the basis of discretionary measures applied by the authorities and not to adjust 
the valuation of public assets for cyclical changes) will be incorporated into the 2011 budget.
In Venezuela, the government maintained its policy of expropriations and approved, at the tail 
end of the legislature, several laws changing the modus operandi of the country’s fi nancial 
system, granting greater discretionality to the public sector and providing for the fi nancing of 
its projects. Finally, Ecuador passed new hydrocarbons legislation entailing the replacement of 
contracts with private oil corporations, which become service providers, in a similar fashion to 
what occurred in the Bolivian gas industry.
In Brazil, the high rate of expansion in the economy in 2010 Q1 stepped up to 2.7% in quarter-
on-quarter terms, driven by the strong growth of domestic demand, and in particular of invest-
ment. There was a signifi cant slowdown in Q2 but, even so, GDP posted a growth quarter-on-
quarter growth rate of 1.2%. Thus, after fi ve quarters of strong expansion, the economy grew 
at a year-on-year rate of 8.8% in Q2, only 0.2 pp down on Q1. The latest economic indicators 
point to some moderation in the pace of expansion in the second half of the year, although 
rates should remain high, in a setting of accommodative fi scal and credit policies and a buoy-
ant labour market. In the light of this dynamism, and of the increase in infl ation to May (5.2% 
compared with the same month a year earlier), the central bank continued with the tightening 
of monetary policy initiated in April; it raised the offi cial interest rate by 75 bp and 50 bp at its 
June and July meetings, placing it at 10.75%, a rate that held unchanged at its August and 
Trade integration and 
structural policies
Economic developments 
by country
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September meetings, following three months of moderation in price growth. The central bank 
justifi ed this pause on the basis of the possible reduction in the neutral interest rate (that con-
sistent with target infl ation) in recent years and of the recent slowdown in activity, although the 
appreciation of the country’s currency might also partly explain this decision. The fi nancial 
capacity of the BNDES development bank was further strengthened, and its interest rate was 
moreover held at 6%. In the fi scal realm, the gradual and slight improvement in the public-
sector primary surplus continued, thanks to the higher growth of central government revenue 
in relation to spending, giving rise to a cumulative 12-month primary surplus of 2% of GDP in 
July. Nonetheless, this fi gure remains below the offi cial target of a primary surplus of 3.3% in 
2010, despite the economy’s dynamism, from which a procyclical stance may be inferred. The 
primary surplus target for 2011 is 3.2%. The strong dynamism of domestic demand has led 
to a deterioration in the trade balance which, combined with the widening defi cit on incomes 
and services, has given rise to a bigger current defi cit (see Chart 11), placing it at 2.3% of GDP 
in the 12 months to August. Sizeable capital infl ows were also recorded in recent months, 
BRAZIL, MEXICO, ARGENTINA AND VENEZUELA 
SOURCES: INEGI MEXICO, Banco Central de Venezuela, and Banco Central de Argentina. 
 
a. 2008Q2 = 100. The dotted line is the forecast of the Banco de México's August 2010 survey. 
b. Quarterly targets setting a range for the average levels of total M2 for the last month of each 
quarter. 
c. The market closed on 18 May, to reopen on 9 June.  
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largely in the form of portfolio investment, translating into a notable appreciation by the ex-
change rate to a high for the year. In this setting the build-up in reserves – the stock of which 
totalled 261.3 billion in August – continued, the tax on fi nancial transactions was raised from 
2% to 4% and subsequently to 6% for fi xed-income investment infl ows in October, and the 
Brazilian sovereign wealth fund was authorised to make foreign-currency-denominated asset 
purchases.6 The PT candidate (Dilma Rouseff) won the fi rst round of the presidential elections 
in early October, with a programme that retains the guiding principles of the economic policy 
of recent years.
In Mexico, activity grew at a high rate in year-on-year terms in the fi rst half of 2010, posting 
rates of 4.3% and 7.6%, respectively, in the fi rst two quarters of the year. Notwithstanding, 
much of the growth may be attributed chiefl y to a statistical effect arising from very low levels 
of comparison in the fi rst half of 2009, in a setting in which the main national accounts variables 
remained below pre-crisis levels (see Chart 11). Indeed, in Q1 the quarter-on-quarter change 
was negative (- 0.6%) and in Q2, although growth was much higher (3.2% quarter-on-quarter), 
it was largely due to the inventory cycle. Mexico was the only country in which external demand 
made a positive contribution to growth in the two quarters, although this contribution was small 
(0.4 pp). This was a consequence of the fact that, although imports posted high growth rates, 
exports rose even more. The higher frequency data published in 2010 Q3 would suggest a 
slight slowdown in the economy as a result of the deceleration in the manufacturing sector and 
in exports to the US market. Set against this persistently high negative output gap, the infl ation 
rate, which had risen to a high of 5% in March 2010 as a result of the rise in VAT, eased sub-
stantially and dipped to 3.7% in September. Core infl ation had been declining for a few months 
previously, and posted a rate of 3.6% in September. The central bank held its offi cial interest 
rates at 4.5% and the yield curve is not discounting movements in the coming quarters. Public 
fi nances worsened slightly in the fi rst half of the year compared with the same period a year 
earlier as a result of the decline in non-tax revenue (owing to the stripping out of the profi ts 
transferred in April 2009 by the central bank to the Treasury further to the exchange rate de-
preciation and the revenue arising on the hedging of oil prices). It was not possible to offset this 
decline with the increase in tax revenue arising from VAT takings. The budget for 2011 main-
tains the austerity characterising 2010, with a 2.3% increase in expenditure and a defi cit of 
0.3%, although no fi scal reform is included. Regarding the external sector, the current account 
balance in the fi rst half of 2010 posted a defi cit equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, lower than in the 
fi rst half of 2009. The fi nancial account ran a surplus, in which inward foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment, mainly in the form of bonds, were prominent. To address the return 
of portfolio fl ows, the monthly auctioning of dollar sale options was maintained, for an amount 
of 600 million, this instrument being reactivated last February. As a result, international reserves 
reached a high of $108 billion in late September. Finally, fl uid access to the international mar-
kets was maintained, and in the fi rst week of October Mexico successfully placed $1 billion in 
a 100-year bond (the fi rst country in the region to do so) at a relatively low cost.
Economic activity in Argentina exhibited similar growth rates to those prior to the fi nancial 
crisis during the fi rst half of 2010, despite the fact that the output gap was already consid-
ered to have closed. Quarter-on-quarter growth thus stood at around 3% in both quarters, 
and the related year-on-year rate rose to 11.8% in Q2. Of note was the growth in domestic 
demand (13.6% in Q2), the result of strong growth in investment (especially in capital goods) 
and of buoyant private and government consumption. The contribution of the external sec-
tor once again turned negative, especially in 2010 Q1 (2.9 pp). This sound behaviour of 
6. Although this is not specifi ed, the sovereign wealth fund will issue local-currency-denominated debt to fi nance these 
acquisitions, so as to make its interventions similar to the sterilised central bank interventions involving dollar purchases.
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economic activity is the consequence of the pick-up in agricultural yields in 2010, of the 
growth in Brazil (especially for the automobile industry) and of the expansionary stance of 
monetary and fi scal policy. The higher frequency indicators suggest that growth will moder-
ate in the second half of the year. The cumulated 12-month primary public surplus rose 
progressively, up to 1.7% of GDP in Q2, owing to the increase in revenue, since public 
spending continued to rise at a higher rate (of around 30%). Infl ation has remained on an 
unfavourable course, increasing strongly in recent months. Indeed, although offi cial infl ation 
stands at around 11% in September (a 5-year high), wage settlements are coming in at 
around 25%, and the government raised the intervals of the different tax brackets by 20%. 
In addition, the central bank pursued a more expansionary monetary policy, updating the 
monetary programme targets for the second half of 2010 (see Chart 11), given the higher 
nominal growth expected for the economy. Further evidence that monetary policy has been 
more expansionary is the downward trend of real interest rates, since nominal rates have 
held stable despite the infl ationary rebound. In the fi nancial arena, a swap involving a portion 
of the public debt in default since 2001 was carried out in late June, 66% of it being taken 
up ($12 billion of the $18.3 million eligible). With this swap and that in 2005, 92.4% of the 
debt declared in default in 2001 has been covered, which has prompted a notable reduction 
in the probability of default of public debt (obtained from the prices implicit in Argentine fi -
nancial assets) and the upgrading of the Argentine government’s foreign-currency-denomi-
nated sovereign debt rating by two credit rating agencies, although the rating is still far off 
investment grade. A further notable development was the announcement by the govern-
ment of the creation of a Federal Disindebtedness Programme, which will entail signifi cant 
fi nancial relief for the provinces, which will discontinue payment of their debts to the central 
government until end-2011 and may reschedule them with 20-year maturities. Despite the 
fact that a portion of the reserves was used to service foreign-currency-denominated debt, 
low private-sector capital outfl ows together with the favourable behaviour of the current ac-
count allowed international reserves (sterilised with Treasury bill issues by the central bank) 
to be built up to a historical high, while the exchange rate of the peso against the dollar held 
on a slightly depreciating trend.
In Chile, activity picked up more quickly than foreseen following the earthquake in late Feb-
ruary. During Q2, GDP increased by 4.3% in quarter-on-quarter terms (after having declined 
by 1.5% the previous quarter) and by 6.5% year-on-year (1.5% in Q1). There was an excep-
tional increase in domestic demand, which expanded in Q2 at a year-on-year rate of 19.4%, 
from an already-high fi gure of 11.8% in Q1. This growth was particularly due to investment 
(specifi cally in capital goods), although private consumption also expanded forcefully. In-
vestment in construction is expected to rise in the coming quarters, owing to reconstruction 
work following the earthquake. The contribution of the external sector to growth turned 
negative in the fi rst half of the year and, moreover, reached a high level (over 10 pp in each 
quarter). This was a result both of the strong growth in imports and of the adverse trend of 
exports, although the latter tended to pick up in Q2 following several quarters of decline. 
This performance also contributed to the virtual elimination of the current account surplus 
(0.1% in Q2). The higher frequency indicators suggest that the high growth was maintained 
in Q3. Turning to the fi scal area, revenue increased by 46% year-on-year in real terms during 
the fi rst half of the year, the result of the buoyancy of domestic demand and of the increase 
in copper prices, which led to a notable reduction in the budget defi cit. The new government 
reported that the structural fi scal defi cit in 2009 was not 1.2% of GDP, but 3.1%, further to 
certain corrections in the calculation methodology proposed by the Structural Balance Sheet 
Advisory Committee, set up to improve the functioning of the Chilean fi scal rule. Accord-
ingly, fi scal policy in the coming years will be more restrictive than previously thought, and 
the new government has renounced attaining a balanced budget in terms of the structural 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 126 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2010 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2010
balance of the end of its mandate. Infl ation continued to increase (2.6% in August), albeit at 
a lower than expected pace and with its underlying components trending favourably. De-
spite this relatively benign trajectory, the central bank embarked on a process of offi cial in-
terest rate rises (225 bp, to 2.75%, following the September monetary policy meeting), with 
the aim of lessening the looseness of monetary policy after the 775 bp reduction in 2009. 
Further, as part of its fi nancing strategy for the reconstruction programme, the Chilean gov-
ernment issued dollar-denominated 10-year bonds on international markets, for the fi rst 
time since 2004, along with peso-denominated bonds, this being the fi rst issue by the Chil-
ean state in local currency on international fi nancial markets. In recent months the peso has 
appreciated signifi cantly in nominal terms against the dollar, a development linked to the 
increase in copper prices, to the rise in offi cial interest rates, to the greater relative surprises 
in growth, to the funds fl owing into the country further to the reconstruction drive, and prob-
ably also to global factors. Lastly, in June Moody’s raised the rating of Chilean foreign-cur-
rency-denominated sovereign debt a notch higher.
Recovery fi rmed in the Colombian economy in the fi rst half of 2010, with year-on-year growth 
of 4.3%, driven by the acceleration in all domestic demand components except investment, 
which continued growing at a similar rate to that in the second half of 2009. The favourable 
trend of stockbuilding was another of the explanatory factors. The notable buoyancy of im-
ports, especially in Q2, accounts for the negative contribution (2.9 pp) of the external sector, 
despite the fact that exports continued to pick up, as shown by the quarter-on-quarter growth 
of over 5% during the fi rst two quarters of 2010. This recovery in activity has come about in a 
benign environment for infl ation, which has held at close to 2%, the lower limit of the central 
bank’s target range for this year (2%-4%). In this setting of gradual infl ation-free recovery, the 
central bank held its interest rate constant at 3%, following the last cut in April. In respect of 
fi scal policy, the government revised its forecast for the non-fi nancial public-sector defi cit 
downwards, to 3.6% of GDP in 2010, and it foresees a further reduction in the defi cit in 2011 
to 3%, due in part to the higher economic growth expected. A fi scal rule was unveiled to man-
age oil resources countercyclically, anticipating a boom in the sector in the coming years. On 
the side of the external sector, there was a notable improvement in the trade balance, against 
a background of higher nominal growth in exports compared with imports, thanks largely to an 
improvement in the terms of trade. This improvement will foreseeably continue in light of the 
resumption of diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Central bank interventions on the foreign 
exchange market in Q2 totalled $20 million daily, as part of a framework of competitive auc-
tions introduced in April. This mechanism was resumed in September, amid concerns by the 
authorities about the appreciation of the Colombian peso. Indeed, during the half-year period, 
the exchange rate continued on a rising trend (10% from late April), standing at around 1,800 
pesos per dollar. Lastly, Standard & Poor’s upgraded the country’s sovereign debt rating a 
notch to “investment grade”.
In 2010 Q2, GDP in Peru increased at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 3.1%, following the rise of 
1.6% recorded in Q1, extending the sound recovery initiated in the second half of 2009. In 
year-on-year terms, GDP increased at a rate of 10.1% in Q2, compared with the rise of 6.1% 
in the previous quarter. Of note was the 11.1% growth of domestic demand during the fi rst half 
of the year compared with the same period a year earlier. This dynamism is a refl ection of the 
pick-up in private consumption, of the growth in investment and of stockbuilding at similar 
rates to those recorded prior to the international fi nancial crisis, and of higher growth in con-
sumption and in public investment. The higher frequency indicators continue to show high 
growth in economic activity in Q3, albeit at somewhat lower rates. The contribution of the ex-
ternal sector to GDP growth turned negative (close to 3 pp) during the half-year period owing 
to the strength of imports and to the practically zero growth of exports in real terms. Nonethe-
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less, the nominal increase in exports was greater than that in imports and close to 40%, year-
on-year, thanks to the improved terms of trade. During the fi rst half of the year the current 
account defi cit stood at 1.1% of GDP, since the trade surplus and greater remittances from 
abroad were more than offset by the defi cit on the services and incomes balances, as the 
profi ts of foreign-held companies increased. Infl ation touched bottom in December 2009 and 
has continued increasing (2.3% in August), give the greater dynamism of domestic demand, 
the disappearance of the base effect and supply-side factors, such as the prices of certain 
foods and, to a lesser extent, of energy products. The central bank increased the offi cial inter-
est rate at all its monetary policy meetings from May to September. This rate was thus raised 
by 175 bp to 3%. However, at the October monetary policy meeting, a pause was decided on. 
These increases in the offi cial interest rate were accompanied by a series of measures that 
raised reserve requirements, both in national and in foreign currency. Meantime, credit contin-
ued to pick up, growing by 16.9% in August in real year-on-year terms. The fi scal impulse is 
holding in 2010 at a similar amount to that in 2009, although the budget defi cit is declining in 
view of higher tax revenue and of the ceilings on public spending set by the government in 
order to meet its fi scal targets for 2010. in recent months, the central bank has used various 
instruments to check the pressures pushing the peso up against the dollar: capital controls 
(raising the requirements imposed on foreign loans at less than two years), dollar purchases 
since June (reserves increased by more than $9 billion to September) and an increase in the 
proportion that pension funds may invest abroad.
In the fi rst half of 2010, Venezuela was the only country in the region to record an economic 
contraction, of 3.5% on average compared with the related period in 2009. It picked up in 
Q2 when GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 3.7% (-1.9% year-on-year). On the de-
mand side, government consumption was once again the most dynamic component, and 
private consumption and investment posted negative year-on-year growth rates, but on a 
lesser scale than in previous quarters. After having contributed 15.7 pp to GDP growth in 
2010 Q1, external demand subtracted 0.7 pp in Q2, owing to the strong contraction in ex-
ports. On the positive side, the energy crisis eased, some of the restrictions on electricity 
consumption were eliminated and the real monthly growth rates of credit turned positive 
once more in June and July, in particular credit to manufacturing companies. Infl ation re-
mained on a very unfavourable course (see Chart 11), and the rate increased substantially 
from January to May 2010, rising to 32% in the latter month, as a result of the devaluation 
of the bolivar in early January, given that bigger rises in prices were observed in food, most 
of which are imported. Subsequently, the infl ation rate fell off slightly to 28.5% in September. 
As regards monetary policy, a key development was the shutdown of the parallel exchange 
rate market in May, so as to avoid a greater depreciation of the bolivar (which had climbed 
to 8.6 bolivar per dollar, compared with 5.3 under the new exchange rate system, controlled 
by the central bank). On the fi scal front, in the face of the proximity of general elections last 
September, the government raised the growth rates of public spending. Turning to the ex-
ternal sector, there was a reduction in the current account balance in 2010 Q2, further to the 
strong rise in imports. Meantime, FDI outfl ows remained negative for the fi fth quarter run-
ning. In the general elections, the parties supporting the government obtained a majority, 
but not one suffi cient to amend fundamental laws or to grant special powers enabling the 
president to govern by decree.
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